Written in a conversational style that transforms complex ideas into accessible ones, this international best-seller provides an interdisciplinary review of the theories and research in cross‐cultural psychology. The book’s unique critical thinking framework, including Critical Thinking boxes, helps to develop analytical skills.

Exercises interspersed throughout promote active learning and encourage class discussion. Case in Point sections review controversial issues and opinions about behavior in different cultural contexts. Cross‐Cultural Sensitivity boxes underscore the importance of empathy in communication. Numerous applications better prepare students for working in various multicultural contexts such as teaching, counseling, health care, and social work. The dynamic author team brings a diverse set of experiences in writing this book. Eric Shiraev was raised in the former Soviet Union and David Levy is from Southern California.

Sensation, perception, consciousness, intelligence, human development, emotion, motivation, social perception, interaction, psychological disorders, and applied topics are explored from cross‐cultural perspectives. New to the 6th Edition: • Over 200 recent references, particularly on studies of non-western regions such as the Middle East, Africa, Asia, & Latin America as well as the US and Europe.

Gesenius ascribes the etymology of midrash to the qal of the common Hebrew verb darash (דָּרַשׁ) 'to seek, study, inquire'. The word 'midrash.

• New chapter on personality and the self with an emphasis on gender identity. • New or revised chapter opening vignettes that draw upon current events. • More examples related to the experiences of international students in the US and indigenous people. • Many more figures and tables that appeal to visual learners. • New research on gender, race, religious beliefs, parenting styles, sexual orientation, ethnic identity and stereotypes, conflict resolution, immigration, intelligence, physical abuse, states of consciousness, DSM-5, cultural customs, evolutionary psychology, treatment of psychological disorders, and acculturation. • Revised methodology chapter with more attention to issues related specifically to cross-cultural research and more on qualitative and mixed methods. • A companion website at www.routledge.com/386 where instructors will find a test bank containing multiple choice, true and false, short answer, and essay questions and answers for each chapter, and a complete set of tables and figures from the text; and students will find chapter outlines, flashcards of key terms, and links to further resources and the authors' Facebook page.

Intended as a text for courses on cross-cultural psychology, multicultural psychology, cultural psychology, cultural diversity, and the psychology of ethnic groups and a resource for practitioners, researchers, and educators who work in multicultural environments. Reviews 'Shiraev and Levy provide a scholarly analysis of cross-cultural psychology that is informative, intriguing, and enjoyable to read. Their descriptions of contemporary applications convey critically important insights for addressing intergroup conflicts and disparities.'

– Cheryl Koopman, Stanford University 'Given the increasingly multicultural nature of modern societies, this insightful and mature excursion into the dynamics of cross-cultural psychology could not come at a more propitious time. This is important reading and highly recommended.' – Jim Sidanius, Harvard University 'The sixth edition of this classic textbook is a must-read for those in the fields of psychology and related social and behavioral sciences. It is an engaging and informative resource for anyone interested in learning how the intricate web of cultural customs, values, and norms permeate our lives and shapes us into who we are.' – Denis Sukhodolsky, Yale University 'I had the privilege to use this text in teaching both undergraduate and graduate courses. This text aims to spark the students’ motivation to learn about cultural contextual variables affecting human behavior, cognitions, and emotions. It offers a critical thinking paradigm and specific exercises, which are priceless in this field and could be applied in other subfields of psychology.'

– Sergei Tsytsarev, Hofstra University Table of Contents 1. Understanding Cross-Cultural Psychology 2. Critical Thinking in Cross-Cultural Psychology 3. Methodology of Cross-Cultural Research 4. Cognition: Sensation, Perception, and States of Consciousness 5.

Intelligence 6. Motivation and Behavior 8.

Human Development and Socialization 9. Psychological Disorders 10. Social Perception, Social Cognition, and Social Interaction 11. Personality and the Self 12.

Applied Cross-Cultural Psychology: Some Highlights About the Authors Dr. Shiraev is a professor, researcher, and author.

He took his academic degrees at St. Petersburg University in Russia and completed a post-doctoral program in the United States at UCLA. He served at various positions at St.

Petersburg University, NVCC, Oregon State University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. His research interests are diverse. He is an author, co-author, and co-editor of twelve books and numerous publications in the fields of global studies, history of science, cross-cultural studies, and political psychology. In his publications, he develops a distinct multi-disciplinary approach to analyze human behavior.

Besides teaching and scholarly work, Eric Shiraev writes opinion essays for the media around the world. He resides near Washington DC. Visit his site: www.ericshiraev.com Dr. Levy has extensive experience as a teacher, therapist, writer, and researcher.

He is Professor of Psychology at Pepperdine University's Graduate School of Education and Psychology, where he has been teaching graduate courses since 1986. He received his B.A. Degree in theater arts from UCLA, a M.A. Degree in psychology from Pepperdine University, a second M.A. Degree in psychology from UCLA, and his Ph.D. In psychology from UCLA, where he specialized in social psychology, with minors in psychological assessment and personality psychology.

He served as Visiting Professor of Psychology in the Soviet Union, where he delivered lectures and workshops in psychology and psychotherapy at Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) State University, the Leningrad Academy of Science, and the Bekhterev Psychoneurological Institute. He was honored as a Harriet and Charles Luckman Distinguished Teaching Fellow at Pepperdine, and was a recipient of the Shepard Ivory Franz Distinguished Teaching Award and Charles F. Scott Fellowship at UCLA. Levy holds professional licenses both in psychology and in marriage and family therapy. He has worked in a wide range of private practice and inpatient psychiatric settings, he has supervised clinical interns, and he has utilized his expertise in psychological testing (particularly the MMPI) in forensic cases. His numerous theoretical and empirical research studies have been published in scientific journals and presented at professional conferences.

His book, 'Tools of Critical Thinking: Metathoughts for Psychology,' garnered widespread acclaim in both academic and clinical settings for its innovative approaches to improving thinking skills. Levy co-authored (with Eric Shiraev) 'Cross-Cultural Psychology: Critical Thinking and Contemporary Applications,' which became an internationally best-selling textbook. Levy is the author of 'Family Therapy: History, Theory, and Practice,' which was the first textbook on the topic available to Russian readers.

His Levy Optimism-Pessimism Scale (LOPS) has been utilized internationally in a variety of research contexts, and he is a member of the Board of Editors for the Journal of Humanistic Psychology. Levy is also the author of numerous satirical articles, including 'The Emperor's Postmodern Clothes: A Brief Guide to Deconstructing Academically Fashionable Phrases for the Uninitiated,' 'How to Be a Good Psychotherapy Patient,' 'Psychometric Infallibility Realized: The One-Size-Fits-All Psychological Profile,' 'Stinks and Instincts: An Empirical Investigation of Freud's Excreta Theory,' and 'A Proposed Category for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM): Pervasive Labeling Disorder.' As a media consultant, Levy has appeared on dozens television and radio broadcasts (including CNN, CBS, NBC, PBS, A&E, and E!), providing psychological perspectives on current events, and examining issues and trends in the mental health fields. He has also worked as a professional director, producer, writer and actor in motion pictures, television and stage. He received an Emmy nomination for Outstanding Performance in a Network Television Series, and he was a guest star on the television series 'Cheers,' where he portrayed the leader of Frasier's low self-esteem group.

Subject Categories • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • BISAC Subject Codes/Headings: EDU020000 EDUCATION / Multicultural Education PSY050000 PSYCHOLOGY / Ethnopsychology SOC008000 SOCIAL SCIENCE / Ethnic Studies / General. Samsung Galaxy Note 2 Pc Suite Software Free Download. Routledge.com eBooks are available through VitalSource. The free VitalSource Bookshelf® application allows you to access to your eBooks whenever and wherever you choose. The Bookshelf application offers access: • Online – Access your eBooks using the links emailed to you on your Routledge.com invoice or in the 'My Account' area of Routledge.com. • Mobile/eReaders – Download the Bookshelf mobile app at VitalSource.com or from the iTunes or Android store to access your eBooks from your mobile device or eReader.

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At least three important military theorists emerged from the experience of the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon: The Austrian Archduke Charles; the Swiss writer Antoine-Henri Jomini; and the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz. The archduke has had very little influence in the United States or Great Britain, since his work was never translated into English.*1 The military-theoretical traditions founded by Jomini and Clausewitz, however, have very definitely had an impact on our military thinking. Most frequently, Jomini is treated as being somehow the opposite of Clausewitz: military educators often hurl the epithets 'Jominian' and 'Clausewitzian' at one another as if those single words somehow summed up their opponents' fallacious world-views and defects of personal character.

On the other hand, a number of thoughtful observers have considered the differences betweem Jomini and Clausewitz to be rather inconsequential. Alfred Thayer Mahan is a case in point.

Mahan's father, military educator Dennis Hart Mahan, is generally considered to have been a devout Jominian, and so is his son (though in fact both were creative thinkers in their own right, and calling them 'Jominians' is an unfair characterization). The younger Mahan eventually became familiar with Clausewitz,*2 calling him 'one of the first of authorities.' However, he found Clausewitz to be in essential agreement with Jomini in all significant respects,*3 so he continued to put forth his arguments in largely Jominian terminology.*4 The great British Clausewitzian Spenser Wilkinson thought that Mahan and Clausewitz were in general accord.*5 In Germany, Albrecht von Boguslawski also argued that Jomini and Clausewitz were saying the same thing. More recently, US Naval War College Professor Michael Handel has sought to reconcile the two theorists.*6 Thus Jomini and Clausewitz often appear either as opposites or as twins.

As usual when we are given a choice between two such clear alternatives, neither really proves to be very useful and the truth lies somewhere else. In reality, Jomini and Clausewitz saw much the same things in war, but saw them through very different eyes. The similarities in their military ideas, which are indeed very great, stem from three sources.

Despite having these things in common, their approaches to military theory were fundamentally different, and the source of these differences can be found in their very different personalities. This is not the place to delve terribly deeply into the arcane theoretical details of these two men's work. Instead, I want to focus on the sources of our modern-day confusion: Why is it that Jomini and Clausewitz look so radically different to some observers, yet so very similar to others? I will attribute this confusion to our frequent lack of sensitivity to the differences in the two men's experiences and personalities, and to the way in which they interacted over time. CLAUSEWITZ Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was a professional soldier from the age of 12 to his death from Cholera—a disease he incurred on active duty—at the age of 51. He first saw combat in 1794 when he was 13. He experienced first-hand Prussia's disastrous military humiliation by Napoleon in 1806, was captured, and returned to Prussia a passionate military reformer.

As a junior staff officer, he worked closely with the great Prussian military reformers Gerhard von Scharnhorst (who was his mentor) and August von Gneisenau (who became his friend and protector). In 1810, he was appointed military tutor to the crown prince, for whom he wrote (in 1812) a military treatise we call The Principles of War.*7 The same year, on a matter of high principle, he gave up his commission and joined the Russian army to fight Napoleon. He fought throughout the Russian campaign and on through the Wars of Liberation of 1813 and 1814. He was Prussian III Corps chief of staff during the campaign of 1815. It was Clausewitz's corps which—outnumbered two-to-one—held Grouchy's forces at Wavre, contributing decisively to Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo.

Clausewitz had a reputation in the Prussian army as both an idealist and a superb staff officer, but he was considered temperamentally unsuitable for command. No hint of personal scandal attaches to Clausewitz, and his intellectual integrity was the driving force behind the ruthless examination of military-theoretical ideas that we find in his greatest book, On War. However, while he rose very high in the King's service, he was widely considered too open to liberal ideas to be altogether politically reliable. His ideas on war are heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionary period, and those ideas were uncomfortable to conservative aristocrats.

Clausewitz's relationship to Napoleon is often misunderstood. Although he is often called the 'high-priest of Napoleon' (Liddell Hart's and J.F.C. Fuller's term for him), it is important to note that, in fact, Clausewitz represents not the ideas of Napoleon but rather those of his most capable opponent, the Prussian military reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst. FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO THEORISTS Aside from their differing relationships to Napoleon, the fundamental differences between Clausewitz and Jomini are rooted in their differing concepts of the historical process and of the nature and role of military theory. Clausewitz saw history in relative terms, rejecting absolute categories, standards, and values. The past had to be accepted on its own terms. The historian must attempt to enter into the mindsets and attitudes of any given period, the 'spirit of the age.'

History was a dynamic process of change, driven by forces beyond the control and often beyond the comprehension of any individual or group. This historicism is particularly obvious in two key themes of On War that are missing in the 1812 Principles of War.

These are the famous notion that 'War is a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means' ( i.e., organized violence) and the recognition that war can vary in its forms depending on the changing nature of policy and of the society within which it is waged. In contrast, Jomini's view of history and of war was static and simplistic. He saw war as a 'great drama,' a stage for heroes and military geniuses whose talents were beyond the comprehension of mere mortals. He saw the revolutionary warfare in which he himself had participated as merely the technical near-perfection of a fundamentally unchanging phenomenon, to be modified only by superficial matters like the list of dramatis personae, technology, and transient political motivations. He drew his theoretical and practical prescriptions from his experiences in the Napoleonic wars.

The purpose of his theory was to teach practical lessons to 'officers of a superior grade.' Accordingly, Jomini's aim was utilitarian and his tone didactic.

His writing thus appealed more readily to military educators. His later work, Summary of the Art of War ( Precis de l'Art de la Guerre, 1838), became, in various translations, popularizations, and commentaries, the premier military-educational text of the mid-nineteenth century.*13 Much of the contrast between Jomini and Clausewitz*14 can be traced to such philosophical factors—and to the frequent abridgement of On War, which makes it appear much more abstract than Jomini's work when in fact they often discussed the same practical subject matter. Despite his insistence that theory must be descriptive rather than prescriptive in nature, Clausewitz frequently provides instructive discussions of common military problems like contested river crossings, the defense of mountainous areas, etc. THEIR INTERACTION As the discussion so far has indicated, there were many parallels and many points of divergence in the personalities, military experiences, and underlying philosophies of these two men. There were also, however, some rather interesting points of intersection. Jomini and Clausewitz may have caught a glimpse of one another from opposite sides during the tragic crossing of the Beresina river during the French retreat from Moscow, but there is no evidence that they ever met.

Nonetheless, they interacted intellectually, influencing one another's thinking over a long period of time. When the young Clausewitz wrote his Principles of War (1812) for his student the Prussian crown prince, he seems to have been rather taken with Jomini and his argument about interior lines. He also used a great deal of Jomini's geometric vocabulary of bases, lines, and points, and was, like Jomini, positive about the usefulness of mountains as defensive lines. Later, in On War, he would be quite skeptical on all these matters. The young Clausewitz also accepted Jomini's fundamental strategic theme: 'The theory of warfare tries to discover how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point.' Even this early in his evolution, he then went on to stress something we think of as more typically Clausewitzian: 'As this is not always possible, theory also teaches us to calculate moral factors: the likely mistakes of the enemy, the impression created by a daring action.

Yes, even our own desperation.' *16 Given twenty years to think about such matters, however, Clausewitz became extremely skeptical of Jomini. In On War, Clausewitz's sweeping critique of the state of military theory appears to have been aimed in large part at the Swiss. It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances in the realm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, they are absolutely useless. They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects. They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites.

Anything that could not be reached by the meager wisdom of such one-sided points of view was held to be beyond scientific control: it lay in the realm of genius, which rises above all rules. Pity the soldier who is supposed to crawl among these scraps of rules, not good enough for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh. No; what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case.*17. CONCLUSIONS: THE RETURN OF JOMINI The significance of all this, aside from whatever antiquarian interest it may arouse, lies in certain recent attempts to revive Jomini. These attempts are part of a reaction against the predominance of Clausewitzian theory in this country since the Vietnam war. Over the years Clausewitz has periodically been declared obsolete, only to reemerge more influential than ever.

Such arguments often focus on the problem of nuclear war, but it seems increasingly likely that it is the nuclear theorists, not Clausewitz, who have been rendered obsolescent.*21 There have also been complaints by military traditionalists about the excessive influence of 'Clausewitz nuts' and by theoretical purists of the 'the prostitution of Clausewitz since 1981, particularly in [the U.S. Army's] FM 100­5 and its various degenerate offspring.'

*22 Both complaints have some justification. The eclecticism of Anglo-Saxon military thought is rooted in the same spirit as the Latin warning, ' Cave ab homine unius libri' ('Beware the man of one book'): a narrow reliance on Clausewitz is inconsistent with the philosopher's own teaching. On the other hand, using On War as a mere stockpile of juicy quotes in support of this doctrinal position or that is also an abuse. In large part, however, criticism of the new Clausewitzianism is simply reaction. Would-be competitors have little choice but to seek to dislodge the Prussian philosopher from his post-Vietnam primacy.

And, of course, some people are simply tired of hearing about this long-dead genius. As David Chandler has put it, 'Clausewitz's airy Kantian generalizations have held sway long enough.' *23 It is also possible that in a world seemingly freed of fundamental ideological (though obviously not nationalist) conflict, in a period in which some would seriously suppose an 'end to History,' Clausewitz's strife-driven world view might come to seem less relevant.*24 Chandler's suggestion that 'Baron Antoine-Jomini's rival (and more prosaic) approach. Is under serious reconsideration' may be a symptom of such a trend—though one may well ask, 'by whom?'

Such a trend may be further encouraged by what seems to some—in forgetful retrospect—to have been the un-Clausewitzian 'simplicity' of the Persian Gulf War. Perhaps the very Clausewitzian complexity of that war's aftermath will squelch the effort to renew Jomini's claim to Guru status. My own argument is that most of what Jomini had to contribute that was of real value—which was a great deal—has long since been absorbed into the way we write practical doctrine. Clausewitz's contributions, on the other hand, have not.*25 Indeed, given the brilliance and subtlety of many of Clausewitz's concepts, it is hard to see how they could ever become the 'conventional wisdom.' Jomini is important in a purely historical sense.

In cultivating our own understanding of war, past, present, and future, we must turn to Clausewitz. Lincoln's chief of staff General Henry W. Halleck is generally considered a Jominian.

He was also definitely aware of Clausewitz and presumably had some notion as to his ideas. His greatest source of inspiration may, however, have been neither Jomini nor Clausewitz, but the Archduke Charles. See Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones, The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973, 27­28, 30, 104, 176. Weigley adopts this view of the Archduke Charles's influence on Halleck in his article 'American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War,' in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 416­17; it did not appear in his earlier chapter on Halleck in Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: 1962), in which he saw Halleck as a more original thinker, albeit heavily influenced by Jomini. Mahan had become familiar with at least the broad outlines of Clausewitz's thought by the 1890s. This is the view of two naval historians, Captain (USN) William Dillworth Puleston, Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, U.S.N.

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 295, and Spector, Professors of War, 121. The editor of Mahan's papers, however, is not sure that Mahan ever read Clausewitz, and if he did, places it around 1910.

See Robert Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and his Letters (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1978), 552, 683,n.11. I am inclined to agree with this assessment, although this does not eliminate the possibility that Mahan knew the broad outlines of On War at an earlier date.

Mahan's interest is further evidenced by his marginal notes in a copy of Major Stewart Murray's 1909 condensation of On War, The Reality of War (London: Hugh Rees, 1909). Mahan's own copy has been lost, but his marginal notes were transcribed into a copy donated to the Naval War College by Puleston, Mahan's biographer. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land: Lectures Delivered at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., between the Years 1887 and 1911 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911; reprinted Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), contains two explicit references to Clausewitz. One is a footnote reference (120) to Clausewitz's sarcastic discussion of 'keys,' (Book VI, Chapter 23 of On War).

The other (in which Mahan refers to Clausewitz as 'one of the first of authorities') is a reference to Corbett citing On War on the relative strengths of defense and offense (279). This is part of an extended discussion of some importance, in that Mahan is comparing the naval and land aspects of strategy, and he is clearly discussing the Clausewitzian interpretation without identifying it as such.

[He used virtually the same phrasing in his discussion of some naval wargames in a letter to Raymond P. Rogers, 4 March 1911, in Alfred Thayer Mahan, eds. Robert Seeger II and Doris D. Maguire, Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975.)] Mahan also discusses 'ends and means' at some length (esp. P5), in a manner strongly reminiscent of Clausewitz.

Carl von Clausewitz, trans. Gatzke, Principles of War (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1942); reprinted in Stackpole Books, Roots of Strategy: Book 2, 3 Military Classics.

Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987. [Originally ' Die wichtigsten Grundsatze des Kriegfuhrens zur Erganzung meines Unterrichts bei Sr. Koniglichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen' (written in 1812; trans. From the 1936 German edition).] Another translation appears as an appendix to J.J. Graham's 1873 translation of On War. On Jomini, see Crane Brinton, Gordon A.

Craig, and Felix Gilbert, 'Jomini,' in Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944); Michael Howard, 'Jomini and the Classical Tradition,' in Michael Howard, ed., The Theory and Practice of War (New York: Praeger, 1966); John Shy, 'Jomini,' in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). The best English-language discussion of Jomini's military career can be found in John R. Elting, 'Jomini: Disciple of Napoleon?' Military Affairs, Spring 1964, 17-26. Unlike most biographical discussions of the Swiss, which are based on his own highly colored reminiscences to people he wished to impress, Elting's study is based on Xavier de Courville, Jomini, ou de le Devin de Napoleon (Paris, 1935). 'Written by Jomini's descendants, from his personal papers, it is the most impartial of his biographies.' For Jomini's theoretical writings in English translation, see Antoine­Henri Jomini, trans.

Holabird, U.S.A. Chi Vuol Essere Milionario Sekonda Edizione Isotopes. , Treatise on Grand Military Operations: or A Critical and Military History of the Wars of Frederick the Great as Contrasted with the Modern System, 2 vols. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1865); Baron de Jomini, trans. Winship and Lieut. McLean, The Art of War (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1854).

Important derivative works include Dennis Hart Mahan's instructional works for West Point; Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1846); Edward Bruce Hamley (1824­93), The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1866). Most discussions of Jomini compare him to Clausewitz. For explicit efforts to do so, see Department of Military Art and Engineering, USMA, Clausewitz, Jomini, Schlieffen (West Point, 1951 [rewritten, in part, by Colonel [USA] John R.

Elting, 1964]); J.E. Edmonds, 'Jomini and Clausewitz' [a treatment extremely hostile to the German], Canadian Army Journal, v.V, no.2 (May 1951), 64­69; Joseph L. Harsh, 'Battlesword and Rapier: Clausewitz, Jomini, and the American Civil War,' Military Affairs, December 1974, 133­138; Major [USAF] Francis S. Jones, 'Analysis and Comparison of the Ideas and Later Influences of Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz,' Paper, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 1985; Colonel [USA] Richard M. Swain, '`The Hedgehog and the Fox': Jomini, Clausewitz, and History,' Naval War College Review, Autumn 1990, 98-109. Martin van Creveld attempted in The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991) 'to construct a different, non-Clausewitzian and non-strategic, framework for thinking about war.'

He argues that war in the post­Cold War era is driven by forces outside the nation-state system and beyond the rational boundaries allegedly emphasized in On War. The pattern of conflict in the post­1945 world no longer yields to the 'Clausewitzian assumption that war is rational.' In this view, the 'Clausewitzian universe' is obsolete because it is centered on warmaking by the 'state'; Clausewitz's alleged trinity of government, army, and people is therefore not applicable to Europe before the Treaty of Westphalia nor to the world emerging from the Cold War era.